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Abstract: 
The New Zealand dairy cooperative Fonterra is one of the largest in the world. 
In 2007, its Board presented a capital restructuring proposal with the aim of 
reducing the equity redemption risk, solving members’ portfolio problems, and 
acquiring capital for the cooperative. The proposal indicated that external owners 
would be allowed, but that members would own most of the stock. The 
shareholders rejected the proposal. This analysis of why the proposal failed shows 
that two specific characteristics of Fonterra were primarily responsible: The 
shareholders considered the Fair Value Share to be instrumental in securing full 
member control and the Shareholders’ Council effectively channeled members’ 
opinions.  
Keywords: Fonterra, New Zealand, cooperative, dairy, Shareholders’ Council, 
Fair Value Share 
Introduction 
In recent decades, several agricultural cooperatives in Western 
economies have undergone a process of conversion, failure, and 
restructuring (Gunnarsson Myrelid 1999; Fulton and Hueth 2009; 
Lamprinakis and Fulton 2011; Boland and Cook 2013; Hess, Lind and 
Liang 2013). This study presents a case where the shareholders succeeded 
in preventing restructuring.  
In 2007, members of the large New Zealand dairy cooperative 
Fonterra rejected a proposal by the Board to change the ownership 
structure of the cooperative. The Board proposed introducing a publicly-
listed entity that would hold the operating assets of the cooperative. The 
intention was that 85% of the listed entity would be held by a 100%-
owned cooperative, with ownership linked to supply. However, this entity 
was not implemented due to a fear among farmers that they would lose 
control.  
Major changes in Fonterra’s capital structure occurred thereafter in 
2009 and 2012. The stakeholders succeeded in finding solutions to raising 
more capital, including external sources, while at the same time securing 
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member control and preventing the redemption risk to the cooperative 
(Fonterra 2009). Shadbolt and Duncan (2014, p. 443) describe the 
innovations as: “…allowing members to hold more shares than required 
and the unbundling of payout to farmers into a dividend on shares and a 
milk price on milk solids supplied” and “… introduction of outside equity, 
not to purchase and become owners in the cooperative, but to purchase 
‘economic rights’ from members and trade them in a separate listed 
exchange.”  
The present study explores whether two specific characteristics of 
Fonterra, its Shareholders’ Council and its Fair Value Share, influenced 
the decision by members to vote against the Board’s capital conversion 
proposal in 2007. These characteristics are interpreted in terms of the 
construct of cooperatives’ vaguely defined property rights. Fonterra’s later 
capital reforms are not analyzed. 
The next section describes the core characteristics that Fonterra 
possessed in 2007, when the restructuring plan was proposed. The 
following sections describe the methodology used for data collection and 
the information obtained. The data are then subjected to theoretical 
interpretation. In a final section, conclusions are drawn.  
Background 
Fonterra Cooperative Group Ltd 
The dairy industry is New Zealand’s largest export earner. The 
major dairy processor is Fonterra, which is one of the world’s largest dairy 
processing firms, exporting about 95% of its production and handling 
approximately 95% of New Zealand’s milk production. Fonterra accounts 
for more than 30% of the world’s trade in dairy products. It also represents 
more than 20% of total New Zealand merchandise exports and 7% of its 
Gross Domestic Product, making it New Zealand’s largest company. 
Fonterra is owned by more than 11,000 New Zealand farmers. Its main 
products are milk powder, cheese, butter, and casein. Important export 
markets are the USA, Japan, the Philippines, Mexico, and Southeast Asia.  
Fonterra was formed in July 2001 after a merger between the 
government organization, the New Zealand Dairy Board, and the 
country’s two largest cooperatives, the New Zealand Dairy Group and 
Kiwi Cooperative Dairies (Nilsson and Ohlsson 2007). To allow for an 
almost monopsony, the government required the introduction of a 
Journal of Cooperatives 
 
4 
“Shareholders’ Council”. Before the merger, the performance of the 
various processors was compared based on the margins they added to the 
Dairy Board’s payout (Bayliss 2003). Since this practice would no longer 
be possible after the merger, the government demanded the introduction of 
a ‘”Fair Value Share”. Furthermore, it demanded that Fonterra be an open 
membership cooperative, fully owned and controlled by farmers, with its 
main objective being adding value to its shareholders’ milk. 
The Shareholders’ Council 
Fonterra’s Board has 13 directors. Under the Constitution, nine are 
elected from the shareholder base for a three-year period. The remainder 
are appointed by the Board and approved by shareholders at the Annual 
General Meeting. Fonterra has no executive directors.  
To ensure that the needs of shareholders would be recognized by 
the Board after the merger, the Shareholders’ Council was established. It 
operates independently of Fonterra, and is made up of 35 elected 
shareholders, one from each of the cooperative’s wards. 
The Shareholders’ Council established Fonterra’s cooperative 
philosophy, which applies to Fonterra’s cornerstone activities, i.e., the 
collection, processing, and marketing of shareholders’ milk, to ensure that 
these activities remain within the true cooperative structure. The principles 
are (Fonterra 2002): 
 Shares in Fonterra Cooperative Group can only be held by 
supplying shareholders. 
 Fonterra’s supplying shareholders agree to the dual 
commitment to supply milk and invest capital. 
 Supplying shareholders are issued with, and must hold, 
cooperative shares in proportion to their total milk solids 
supplied. 
 Control of Fonterra is exercised by its supplying shareholders, 
who have voting rights in proportion to their total milk solids 
supplied. 
 Financial benefits and obligations that arise from cornerstone 
activities are allocated to supplying shareholders in proportion 
to their total milk solids supplied. 
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The Fair Value Share 
Shareholders’ investments in Fonterra are equivalent to purchased 
shares. Preceding the merger, no market for trading shares in the 
cooperatives existed. Transactions were based on a nominal share value 
and therefore shareholders could not assess the value of their investments. 
In connection with the merger, an appreciable and depreciable share was 
introduced – the Fair Value Share. Its value is decided by the Board before 
the start of each season, based on a valuation range determined by an 
independent valuer appointed by the Shareholders’ Council. When setting 
the range, the independent valuer takes the following factors into account: 
 Fonterra’s likely future earnings after deducting the valuer’s 
assessment of the commodity milk price in the future. 
 Projected earnings of Fonterra’s separate businesses, corporate 
overheads, research and development, and other operations. 
 Forecast volume of milk supplied to Fonterra. 
The Fair Value Share reflects the value of the future return to 
shareholders from Fonterra’s value added activities. This value represents 
the extra return Fonterra is able to create on top of what a business selling 
only basic commodity products from New Zealand can earn. Hence the 
value comes from sales of consumer and food service products. The 
shareholders hold shares in proportion to the volume of milk they supply. 
No dividend is paid on shares. 
The Board’s Proposal for Capital Structure  
In 2007, Fonterra’s Board suggested a change in the capital 
structure. The Board predicted large investment opportunities in the global 
dairy industry. According to the Board, Fonterra’s existing capital 
structure had some shortcomings (Fonterra, 2007): 
 “Exposing the company to unsustainable redemption risk” 
 “Does not allow farmer choice “ 
 “Will not allow the delivery of Fonterra strategy due to 
insufficient capital” 
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The Board claimed that a redemption risk existed, as the 
appreciation in the Fair Value Share provided an incentive to leave the 
cooperative. A high value of the Fair Value Share also made it difficult for 
young people to get into dairy farming because of the need for a large 
initial investment. Furthermore, the Board claimed that shareholders 
wanted choice regarding their investment portfolios and that the future of 
Fonterra depended on its growth strategy, which would require capital. 
The Board reviewed the existing capital structure when assessing whether 
the capital structure would serve its strategy and solve the issues of 
redemption risk and members’ investment choices.  
According to the Board’s proposal, the supplier cooperative would 
remain as Fonterra Farmer Co-operative and a second company, Fonterra, 
would be created (Fonterra, 2007). All the assets and liabilities in the 
cooperative would go into Fonterra. Fonterra would be listed and hence 
the stock market would determine the value of the shares. After listing, 
farmers would own approximately 65% through the Fonterra Farmer Co-
operative and around 15% through individual shareholding. The public 
would hold the remaining 20%. In legal terms, Fonterra would be a 
subsidiary of Fonterra Farmer Co-operative.  
Approach 
Data for the present analysis were collected in January 2009 
through personal interviews with 12 individuals with insights into 
Fonterra. These included individuals who advocated conversion and 
individuals who worked to prevent it, and they were divided into four 
groups: Board members, Shareholders’ Council members, dairy farmers, 
and individuals outside Fonterra with insights into cooperatives. An 
interviewee often suggested another person worth interviewing. The 
different positions of the interviewees provided broad perspectives. 
The interviews were carried out using a structured question guide 
focusing on the Board’s capital restructuring proposal. The questions were 
open, and in some interviews, led to further questions. The interviews 
lasted for about an hour each. Eleven of the interviewees permitted audio-
recording of their interview, and the recordings were transcribed.  
The next section presents the views within the four groups of 
interviewees and examines the extent to which the shareholders’ reactions 
to the Board’s proposal may be related to the two government stipulations 
made in connection with the formation of Fonterra.  
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Information obtained through the interviews 
The	Shareholders’	Council	
The Board is responsible for the governance of the company, while 
the Shareholders’ Council works with regional representation. The 35 
wards elect one councilor each.  
This is quite good because even though you get elected 
through an election process, you never want to mix up your 
roles between representation and governance. As a 
governor it is your obligation to run the business in the best 
interest of all shareholders. The Shareholders’ Council 
plays the representative role and should also help inform 
the Board of issues faced by the farmer shareholders. 
(interview with Jim van der Poel, Board member) 
With only nine farmer directors, the Board’s communication with 
shareholders is limited. However, the Shareholders’ Council can carry out 
the function of explaining what is going on in Fonterra. Since each ward 
has one councilor, a network is created.  
Most farmers just want to be dairy farmers and do not take 
an interest in what happens at the Board level. The 
councilors are living in the district they represent, and 
people generally know them. (interview with Jim van der 
Poel, Board member) 
Many non-elected directors are said to have no knowledge of 
cooperatives. A concern is that some Fonterra directors are not committed 
to keeping Fonterra as a cooperative. One interviewee argued that Fonterra 
should bring in external directors with knowledge about cooperatives. 
Another comment was that business advisors lack knowledge about 
cooperatives.  
The Shareholders’ Council must ensure that Fonterra follows the 
Constitution. The councilors interviewed here pointed out that it is 
important never to forget these obligations. If the Shareholders’ Council is 
able to perform its duties, trust from the shareholders will be strengthened. 
The Shareholders’ Council also has the role of monitoring the Board, but 
does not have the authority to make any business decisions. However, it 
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can call a special meeting with the Board to solve problems. The 
relationship between the Board and the Shareholders’ Council 
occasionally becomes strained. According to the interviewees, the 
Shareholder Council’s most powerful tool is to criticize the Board behind 
closed doors.  
Fonterra’s General Assemblies are conducted by video-conference, 
whereby the Chairman of the Board gets a better opportunity to control the 
meeting. Anybody demanding change has to act in advance. The 
Shareholders’ Council acts to ensure that farmers are represented on the 
Board. Because the Shareholders’ Council represents the shareholders in 
dealings with the Board, it has also created less direct involvement than 
when shareholders attend meetings.  
As companies get bigger, the Board becomes less 
concerned with shareholder issues and more with business 
management. Hence there was a need for an organization 
to truly speak on behalf of the shareholders. (interview with 
Keith Holmes, dairy farmer) 
At one time, more open communication existed between the 
directors and members, but fewer members now ring up their local 
director and complain. Some members feel that going to a meeting is a 
waste of time. Members rarely see the Board members and the executives 
and farmers are concerned that the Board and executives do not 
understand the business of farming. A further concern is that some 
directors will not permit challenges from potential new directors and will 
hold power at any cost.  
25 years ago when I was farming in Taranaki and 
supplying milk to Kiwi, if there was a dairy meeting (we 
were sort of on the main road) everyone would pass us to 
go to the meeting. And farmers were a lot more involved 
when the company was smaller and they could relate to it 
better. There is certainly not that involvement now. 
(interview with Tom Mason, dairy farmer) 
Most members know little about Fonterra’s international 
operations. The Shareholders’ Council has to make sure that the 
information it provides to the shareholders accurately reflects what is 
happening. A problem mentioned by one interviewee is that it is difficult 
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to find skilled candidates for the Shareholders’ Council. The Council also 
mitigates the tension between the members and the Board and organizes 
debates in village halls.  
Fonterra has become big and complex; hence the issues 
have become difficult to grapple with. As a result, there has 
been a certain amount of passing the buck to the 
Shareholders’ Council. (interview with Keith Holmes, dairy 
farmer) 
The media has sometimes criticized the councilors when they 
support the Board. Among the farmers interviewed, there was also an 
element of mistrust in the Shareholders’ Council. Some members feel that 
the Shareholders’ Council listens too much to the Board and members feel 
powerless (interview with John Luxton, dairy farmer). 
Instead of being a watchdog on behalf of the shareholders, 
the Shareholders’ Council has become a puppet for the 
Board. (interview with Catherine Bull, dairy farmer) 
In general, however, farmers think that the Shareholders’ Council 
protects the shareholders. When Fonterra appears to be in trouble, the 
Council realizes that it has to get in touch with the Board. A concern 
expressed by one member is that it may be difficult to find Board 
members that represent the membership. The members’ best opportunity 
of disciplining the Board is through the Shareholders’ Council. 
The councilors interviewed claimed that it is a privilege for the 
farmers to have a group of people who have access to more information 
than the average member. However, due to the fact that the Shareholders’ 
Council represents farmers to the Board, there is a risk of less involvement 
by members than would be the case without the Council.  
A lot of the farmers abdicate the responsibility for 
involvement in Fonterra to the Shareholders’ Council or a 
council member. (interview with Blue Read, Council 
member) 
During the capital restructuring process, the councilors attended 
meetings convened by the Board and formed opinions about the new 
direction the Board was proposing. However, the Shareholders’ Council 
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adopted a neutral stand until information had been collected from the 
members by formal surveys and discussion groups. This information 
indicated to the Shareholders’ Council that the members were not happy 
with the proposal.  
We were not promoting or negating the proposal, but we 
were making sure that people understood the particular 
new parts of the proposal. (interview with Campbell 
Shearer, Council member)  
When dealing with complex matters such as capital restructuring, 
the Board and the Shareholders’ Council may have secret debates. The 
Shareholders’ Council later informs the farmers and reports back to the 
Board about members’ opinions. Disputes between the Board and the 
Shareholders’ Council may be destructive, damaging members’ trust in 
both parties. A councilor interviewed here pointed out that if no council 
was in place to convey the information to the members, groups of self-
appointed people trying to effect change in their own interests would 
emerge. In Fonterra, the term “ginger groups” is used.  
During the capital restructuring process, the Shareholders’ Council 
commissioned a report about what farmers thought about the proposal. 
The response was overwhelmingly negative. The Board realized the 
proposal was not as good as management thought and at one stage brought 
in a mediator to try to relieve the tensions between management and the 
Board.  
According to one of the interviewees, reports from the 
Shareholders’ Council are more informative than reports from the 
directors. It seems that the Shareholders’ Council plays an important role, 
especially in protecting the smaller farmers. Fonterra’s members are both 
family farmers and corporate farmers. This diversity creates tension, since 
corporate farmers want changes on economically rational grounds, 
whereas family farmers also have a community perspective.  
The Shareholders’ Council is a wonderful voice for farmers 
to make their views known to the Board, and it is inevitable 
that members are more involved because of the 
Shareholders’ Council and if it was not there, Fonterra 
would probably have been demutualized by now. (interview 
with Alan Robb, independent financial commentator) 
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The Shareholders’ Council expresses an opinion on all 
constitutional matters. The Board has never gone to the farmers with a 
proposal that the Shareholders’ Council did not support. However, one 
interviewee expressed a worry that the Board will tell the Shareholders’ 
Council that its public statements harm the cooperative.  
As the Board was forming its view regarding the capital 
restructuring proposal, the Shareholders’ Council awaited the voice of the 
farmers before revealing its view. A possible reason is that the 
Shareholders’ Council thought the proposal was “too hot to handle” 
(interview with Earl Rattray). If the Shareholders’ Council had formed a 
negative view of the proposal, the Board would probably not have taken 
the proposal to the members.  
The lesson for Fonterra here is that you cannot go to a vote 
if you do not have the Shareholders’ Council’s support. 
You also cannot put a proposal in front of the members if 
you do not have the Shareholders’ Council’s support. 
(interview with Earl Rattray, former Board member) 
Telephone surveys showed that 85% of the members did not like 
the proposal, so the Board postponed the vote. However, members believe 
that the Board still wants to change Fonterra’s capital structure. Thus 
members feel that Fonterra is not always honest with them and that the 
communication from the Board is not always sufficient.  
The next thing in the media is that the proposal is off the 
agenda because the shareholders do not want it. Then you 
read in the paper that the Chairman of the Board is saying 
it is back on the agenda, which means he has ignored the 
voice of the shareholders. (interview with Catherine Bull, 
dairy farmer) 
The farmers interviewed feared the capital restructuring proposal 
would lead to the cooperative being listed on the stock exchange. Some 
did not think a cooperative could stay partially demutualized. Other 
farmers agreed with the Board that members have to be given a choice as 
to whether they want to take part in the business outside the core business 
or not. Furthermore, they believed that the core business had to remain a 
cooperative. Farmers wanted to own the processing plants and the 
infrastructure to get their product to the market.  
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A worry expressed by one farmer interviewed was that New 
Zealanders had difficulty in understanding that other cooperatives, for 
example in Europe, had been demutualized step by step. Hence, New 
Zealand farmers could not see what a new capital structure would entail.  
The	Fair	Value	Share	
The valuation of the Fair Value Share is quite complex. It is partly 
based on the cash value, mainly coming from the value-added part of the 
business. The valuation also includes market multiples, where the valuer 
makes comparisons with other international firms. When setting the value 
of the Fair Value Share, the independent valuer considers Fonterra’s ten-
year business plans and projections. On such bases, the valuer comes up 
with a value, discounted into the current value of the cooperative.  
Some members might not understand the function of the Fair 
Value Share, while others do not believe the growth stories. Members 
worry when the share price sometimes drops.  
Most farmers just want to be farmers – they want to get up 
and milk their cows and make sure the tanker is coming 
and that the check comes in the mail every 20th of the 
month. They want to be confident that they have an outlet 
for their milk and that they get a fair milk price. (interview 
with Jim van der Poel, Board member) 
According to the interviewees, an issue is that the way the Fair 
Value Share is calculated can give the larger members with large 
production volumes exorbitant amounts of money. Due to the large-scale 
structure of New Zealand dairy farming, a number of members operate 
several farms of considerable size that they no longer run themselves. The 
large milk quantity thus created entails a large number of shares. 
According to one of the interviewees, the 200 largest members control 
50% of the milk in Fonterra. 
A disconnect is growing between these large shareholding farmers 
and farmers with smaller herds and fewer shares. Small producers are also 
marginalized within the existing voting system, where shares, and thus the 
number of votes, are in proportion to the farmer’s milk solids. 
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A fear today, and it is not far away for Fonterra, is where 
the shares are in the hands of too few. (interview with 
Campbell Shearer, Council member) 
Conflicts of interest between different member categories are 
increasing, because some New Zealand farmers are buying sheep farms 
and converting them to dairy farms. They compare the price of a dairy 
farm with what it would cost to convert the sheep farm, what the share 
price is, and how much they can afford to pay for the sheep farm. In times 
when the price of the Fair Value Shares is low, they pay more for the 
sheep farm. Thus farmers who sell their sheep farms benefit at the expense 
of long-time Fonterra members, who have to contribute to the 
establishment of new dairy plants.  
One reason for the proposed capital restructuring was as a way to 
acquire more equity for the cooperative. The Board has a duty to align the 
interests of shareholders and the company. If the Board wants to secure 
Fonterra’s business with its customers, it has to make the firm grow with 
its customers. Ten customers in different parts of the world take half of 
Fonterra’s production. When Fonterra had simple business operations, the 
cooperative could even have shares with a nominal, non-appreciable 
value. However, once Fonterra progressed beyond being a simple 
business, the nature of the capital requirements changed (pers. comm. 
Margolis, Executive director, New Zealand Cooperative Association).  
Many of the shareholders do not know the scope of the business that 
they are in. (interview with Jim van der Poel, Board member) 
The Board believed that Fonterra needed capital to address the 
redemption risk. The Fair Value Share means that Fonterra’s members are 
entitled to some of the growing wealth as the cooperative expands. 
However, Fonterra must have funds available for returning capital to 
exiting members. Since the cooperative is responsible for the remaining 
members, the exiting members must not receive more than they are 
entitled to, or expose the remaining members to risk.  
A stipulation from the government at the foundation of Fonterra 
was that a certain percentage of the milk Fonterra collects should be sold 
at cost price. This demand was established to enable competing dairy 
companies to start up. This practice is now becoming an issue for 
Fonterra, since new investor-owned firms (IOFs) have been formed in 
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New Zealand. Fonterra pays the same transfer cost across the country, 
while the IOFs have based themselves in intensive dairy areas and hence 
are able to pay more than Fonterra. Thus Fonterra’ redemption risk is 
increasing.  
The only way to obtain equity capital used to be retaining earnings 
or issuing a subscription of new shares from members. Refraining from 
payout to members would make the Fonterra cooperative vulnerable, 
because more recent members might leave. A likely occurrence is that 
perhaps 60% of farmers would agree to Fonterra retaining their earnings to 
invest. However, when a company like Fonterra is pursuing an investment 
strategy, it cannot afford to disappoint 40% of its members. The other 
reason why retention of earnings has not been applied in the past is that 
Fonterra has experienced constant growth. One concern with issuing a 
subscription of new shares is that New Zealanders do not want to stimulate 
dairy production much more, because land is being lost to alternative uses 
such as wine or kiwifruit production. Another concern is that farmers have 
other options; with new IOFs, emerging farmers no longer depend on 
supplying Fonterra.  
When formulating its restructuring proposal, the Board stated its 
belief in the value of keeping the core business integrated. It also believed 
that the only way of dealing with redemption risk was by cutting the 
business long-ways, meaning that the core business would stay untouched, 
but external investors would be allowed to contribute equity to other parts 
of the business. This strategy would bring in capital and farmers would 
still own the core business. One interviewee said that according to a well-
known accounting firm, New Zealand cooperatives have no difficulties in 
raising external capital. The Board feared that there would be tension if it 
allowed outside investors or individual farmers to gain ownership that was 
disproportionate to their milk supply. If the milk price were to be set 
transparently, there would be less tension (interview with Mark Cessnay, 
dairy farmer). 
Farmers disliked the Board’s proposal because they were afraid of 
losing control. Investment in their farms relied on obtaining a good price 
and market for their milk. They saw Fonterra, or at least its manufacturing 
part, as an extension of their farm. A high share value also makes it 
difficult for young farmers to enter the business and those who manage to 
enter make a loss if the share price falls. A high value of the Fair Value 
Share also becomes an incentive for members to redeem their shares and 
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find another dairy processing firm. However, members reported that if 
Fonterra just treated them as owners and performed better than other 
companies, there would be no reason to leave. A further issue with the 
Fair Value Share is that farmers are exposed to high financial risk when a 
large part of their wealth is in one type of asset rather than spread in a 
larger portfolio.  
A very important issue is that we are not in it for the 
investment or for a return on our shares. We are in it for a 
return on our milk. (interview with Doug Bull, former dairy 
farmer) 
Having control of Fonterra is important to all New Zealand farmers 
because they depend on having their milk picked up every day. Apart from 
that, they all have a different approach to farming in terms of herd size, 
level of debt, and the image of a dairy cooperative’s functions. Through 
membership in Fonterra, they are guaranteed collection of any quantity of 
milk. According to our interviewees, if the dairy processing function were 
to be owned by IOFs, the dairy industry in New Zealand would decline.  
What I want from Fonterra can be quite different to what 
someone else wants. (interview with Tom Mason, dairy 
farmer) 
The interviewees noted that some members seem to be confused by 
the value of the Fair Value Share going up and down and the lack 
understanding of the valuation methodology. A risk exists of faulty 
decisions being made by members who do not understand farming. The 
personal view of one Shareholders’ Council interviewee was that the 
valuation methodology was a mistake. The value of the Fair Value Share 
is also heavily affected by factors beyond the control of the cooperative, 
such as exchange rates and global commodity prices. 
I do not think farmers wanted the Fair Value Share at all, 
because 90% of the value is represented in your farm and 
the facilities that the factories have. Not in the value-added 
parts of the business. (interview with Blue Read, Council 
member) 
Some members have made large investments in Fair Value Shares 
and then lost money. Altogether, farmers have lost close to 2.5 billion NZ 
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dollars in two consecutive valuations. This occurrence will differentiate 
farmers. Some will be opposed to Fonterra making investments outside the 
core business while others have been asking for a chance to contribute, but 
there has been no opportunity for farmers to contribute capital for a 
specific investment purpose.  
The Fair Value Share was established to make Fonterra function 
like a public company where members could exit by selling their shares. 
The intention was to have a “fair” value, but whether it is fair or not really 
depends on the calculation mode. Instead of basing the value on expected 
earnings, it could be based on the value of Fonterra’s assets. Hence the 
Fair Value Share gives exiting farmers a larger share than the remaining 
farmers could get if Fonterra’s business were to be liquidated and all 
members were paid proportionally.  
The Fair Value Share becomes an investment with an 
expected increase in value, whereas with a nominal share 
the invested amount is seen as a contribution to capital 
needs. (interview with Alan Robb, independent financial 
commentator) 
Analysis  
The	Problems	of	Vaguely	Defined	Property	Rights	
The development in Fonterra can be explained in terms of the 
vaguely defined property rights problem, which is a widely used construct 
in the literature on cooperatives. A point of departure is the definition of 
cooperatives suggested by Vitaliano (1983, p. 1079):  
A cooperative can be defined as an economic organization 
whose residual claims are restricted to the agent group that 
supplies patronage under the organization’s nexus of 
contracts (i.e. the member-patrons) and whose board of 
directors is elected by this same group.  
As collective organizations, cooperatives’ residual claims are thus 
not openly tradable, a feature which is claimed to lead to some problems 
(Cook 1995; Hendrikse and Feng 2013). These problems may become 
sufficiently severe to cause a cooperative to be dissolved. However, their 
severity depends on various characteristics of the cooperative. 
 Vol. 30 [2015]      
 
17
A cooperative that has an open membership will suffer as new 
members may enter without contributing accordingly, and so they become 
free riders at the expense of the existing members. This is the so-called 
internal free rider problem or common property problem.  
An external free rider problem occurs because an open 
membership cooperative cannot avoid non-members enjoying some 
externalities created by the cooperative. For example, if a cooperative 
succeeds in raising the product price level for member-suppliers, 
competing firms will have to pay at least the same price, to the benefit of 
non-members. This mechanism is often called the competitive yardstick 
effect of cooperatives. However positive it is for farmers at large, it is 
negative for cooperative members.  
A portfolio problem is associated with collective ownership 
because the residual claim owners have no access to any capital market. 
The members cannot adapt their investments in the cooperative to their 
individual preferences as regards risk levels and return demands. The 
decisions concerning the allocation of the cooperative’s assets are made by 
a collective body, the Board of Directors.  
The horizon problem appears as the present generation of members 
may want to reap as much benefit as possible, thereby threating the 
survival of the cooperative and also their own future benefits. Both the 
horizon problem and the portfolio problem are aggravated in cooperatives 
with substantial unallocated capital and complex business operations. 
Then members have little attachment to the organization. In problem-laden 
cooperatives, members may even induce the board to pay prices that are 
higher than the cooperative can afford. A large membership means 
heterogeneity and thus “multiple, sometimes conflicting, social or 
economic objectives” exist (Hogeland 2006, p. 68).  
Low member involvement contributes to the influence cost 
problem. A large and heterogeneous membership and sizeable and 
complex business operations may cause members to lose interest in the 
cooperative (Österberg and Nilsson 2009; Feng, Friis and Nilsson 2015). 
Hence, the membership at large will be characterized by low involvement, 
low trust, and low amounts of other social capital (Nilsson, Svendsen and 
Svendsen 2012). When the membership shares can be transferred only at 
par value, the members have little reason to consider the long-range 
consequences of the cooperative’s investment decisions.  
Journal of Cooperatives 
 
18
Because the residual claims are not traded on the market, they are 
not subject to scrutiny by financial analysts, the mass media, and other 
external parties (Holmström 1999). The members at large are most often 
neither competent nor interested in analyzing the annual reports issued by 
cooperatives (Gaurwitsch and Nilsson 2010). The consequence is a control 
problem or follow-up problem. The board and the CEO may make 
investment decisions that are not the best decisions for the membership.  
Associated with this is the decision-maker problem, whereby the 
leadership of a cooperative has difficulties in judging what the members 
consider to be in their best interests. Thus although the representatives 
may desire to fulfil the members’ wishes they are not able to do so, 
especially as the membership also constitutes a heterogeneous body.  
The	Shareholders’	Council	
Even though Fonterra was already a large and complex cooperative 
when it was established, it does not seem to suffer much from the vaguely 
defined property rights problem. This may be explained by the 
Shareholders’ Council and the Fair Value Share.  
The Shareholders’ Council has the purpose of safeguarding 
member interests in relation to the Board, while the Board is responsible 
for the business operations. This arrangement is a matter of division of 
labor, which requires good coordination between the two organizational 
units.  
The Shareholders’ Council helps to reduce the members’ influence 
cost problem. To the extent that the members have trust in the councilors, 
they do not need to spend much time and effort in supervising the Board. 
This observation is supported by the interviewees. It is also in the 
councilors’ interest to make sure that the members have trust. All this is 
fully clear to the Board members. They recognize the power of the 
Shareholders’ Council, and hence the directors tend to listen to the 
councilors. It is likely that the Shareholders’ Council also alleviates the 
control problem, although none of the interviewees mentioned this.  
As in most other countries and agricultural industries, dairy 
farming in New Zealand is undergoing a process of concentration. 
However, farmers with small and large operations alike are members of 
Fonterra on equal terms, and the Shareholders’ Council must defend the 
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rights of every one. It seems that the family farmers are in need of more 
attention than the corporate or large-size farm operations. Again, the 
Shareholders’ Council is reducing the influence cost problems for the 
membership in its entirety.  
Likewise, the councilors are aware of the power that they have as a 
consequence of the members’ trust. The fact that the Shareholders’ 
Council did not react immediately to the Board’s capital restructuring 
proposal relates to the councilors being eager to preserve their position 
among the members. The Council conducted investigations until it became 
clear what the members would think about the proposal.  
This division of labor effectively reduces the property rights and 
horizon problems. Hardly any risk of social concerns is being considered 
in the business decisions. The Shareholders’ Council is not involved in 
any business decisions. Members cannot promote short-term and selfish 
interests through the Council. Hence, the Council is instrumental in 
curbing the influence of the so-called ginger groups, which consist of self-
selected members who are able to reach out with critical opinions about 
Fonterra. They have thus no legitimacy for the membership at large, so 
they could create damage to Fonterra if they were to succeed in promoting 
benefits to themselves. A positive consequence of the ginger groups is that 
they make it even more important to have councilors with good 
information, thereby reducing the members’ influence cost problems. 
Since the exit options are limited for most members, a well-
functioning cooperative will have the effect of reducing members’ 
transaction costs (Valentinov, 2007). However, the expansion strategy of 
Fonterra’s management is not in harmony with the members’ user 
interests, since its members do not perceive this strategy to be reducing 
their transaction costs. The Shareholders’ Council is not opposed to 
expansion, but it has the task of informing the members and balancing the 
Board, i.e., providing some solution to the decision-maker problem. 
The members’ feeling of identity with Fonterra is thus not an 
expression of cooperative ideology (Morfi et al. 2015). Rather, the 
members are loyal because they have made large investments in their farm 
operations and in Fonterra, and they are eager to keep an open 
membership cooperative which guarantees their delivery rights. Without 
such a cooperative, many members would have difficulty reaching the 
market with their milk.  
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Fair	Value	Share	
The Fair Value Share was established as a way of mitigating 
internal free rider problems. The members are obliged to own such shares 
in proportion to their milk volume. When Fonterra uses the capital to 
invest in adding value to members’ milk, members are not reluctant to 
invest in Fonterra. As regards investment in processing non-members’ 
milk, however, members are less interested. Processing of non-members’ 
milk by Fonterra has created tensions between members and the Board. 
Nevertheless, the Fair Value Share has created a positive view among the 
members at large, because the Fair Value Share has increased in value.  
Fonterra’s growing milk supply and growing assets explain why 
members were not asked for investment capital before the Fair Value 
Share was introduced. Considering investments regarding processing non-
members’ milk, members did not seem to be interested in contributing 
capital. Hence, Fonterra did not have a major internal free rider problem. 
However, the Fair Value Share may give rise to some kind of free riding 
in adjacent industries. One interviewee said that lamb or beef farmers, for 
example, may be external free riders, because when the Fair Value Share 
price is low they get a higher price for their land. The sheep farmer has 
contributed nothing, but sells the land to a dairy farmer and receives more 
money.  
The high value of the Fair Value Share means that some farmers 
may hesitate to buy shares in Fonterra. Instead, they may deliver their milk 
to IOFs, where no entry fee is required. Some dairy farmers deliver to 
Fonterra on a contract without buying shares. The Fair Value Share’s high 
value creates incentives not to enter Fonterra and to exit and cash in. Even 
though such behavior may create financial problems for Fonterra, this 
cannot be characterized as free riding, because these farmers would have 
to accept higher risks as regards milk price and delivery conditions.  
The Fair Value Share is appreciable (and depreciable), although 
the price is not a market price but is decided on administrative grounds. 
Due to Fonterra’s valuation principles, the value that members obtain on 
leaving the cooperative is higher than the value they would receive if the 
cooperative were to be liquidated. Hence when exiting members get their 
shares redeemed, Fonterra is subject to asset stripping. In the event of a 
large number of exits and if Fonterra’s operations did not yield good 
capital returns, the cooperative would be threatened. In that case, the 
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exiting members would be internal free riders. A positive side of the 
members’ possibility to exit and get the value of the Fair Value Shares 
redeemed is that the horizon problem gets an effective solution.  
Compared with a nominal share with a lower value, the Fair Value 
Share contributes to a portfolio problem. Members have to make a large 
payment, but the Board’s risk preference probably does not match that of 
the individuals. When supplying large quantities of milk, the farmer has to 
buy many shares and membership becomes risky. To some extent the Fair 
Value Share can also be said to mitigate the portfolio problem, because the 
appreciation might make it more profitable than any other investment 
opportunity. However, since the valuation method is not clearly 
understood, the extent to which this is actually happening is uncertain. 
Farmers are Fonterra members in order to have a secure market 
channel for their milk. However, their large investments make Fonterra 
resemble an investor-owned firm. Hence, there may be a misalignment of 
the farmers’ interests and those of the Board and management. A problem 
is that the valuation of the Fair Value Share is difficult to interpret in the 
absence of similar investment opportunities. No objective way is available 
of assessing the change in the share value and deciding what measures to 
take. The Fair Value Share adds to the gulf between the members on one 
hand and the Board and management on the other. Thus, the members 
have an influence cost problem, although this is largely mitigated by the 
Shareholders’ Council.  
In summary, the Fair Value Share solves some problems caused by 
the vaguely defined property rights. However, it also causes a free rider 
problem and a portfolio problem, although Fonterra members do not seem 
to perceive unidentifiable property rights as a problem.  
The	Capital	Restructuring	Proposal	
According to the interviewees, the capital restructuring proposal 
put forward in 2007 was a product developed by the management and 
approved by the Board. The leadership cared mainly for the company and 
less for the cooperative structure. A reason might be that the managers 
regarded Fonterra as any other company, hence seeking expansion. The 
leadership had not investigated the members’ opinions and failed to 
inform the members. 
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The proposal may thus be seen as a result of influence cost 
problems, decision-maker problems, and follow-up problems, which might 
have become serious had the Shareholders’ Council not existed. The 
process that followed after the proposal was presented can also be 
explained in the same property rights context. 
The members’ opposition to the capital restructuring proposal 
would not have been possible without the existence of the Fair Value 
Share. The members’ strong involvement was most likely a consequence 
of their large investments in their farm enterprises and in Fair Value 
Shares. The members’ assets might have been threatened if Fonterra did 
not remain fully in the hands of the members. Due to the conditions 
prevailing in the New Zealand dairy industry, the farmers’ considered the 
existence of an open membership cooperative that grants delivery rights to 
be indispensable. Without such a cooperative, the members considered 
that their transaction costs would become very high.  
Even though the system for evaluating the Fair Value Share is 
often subject to criticism and difficult to understand, the share provides a 
guarantee for full member control. Accepting external investors in the 
operations working with non-member milk was seen as a first step towards 
demutualization, and it might be followed by further steps.  
The existence of the Fair Value Share contributed to create 
member involvement in connection with the capital restructuring proposal. 
The Fonterra members’ influence cost problem and control problem were 
reduced thanks to the fact that the Shareholders’ Council has the task of 
following up on management. If members know that the Shareholders’ 
Council is safeguarding their interests, they might have weaker incentives 
to remain highly involved. The way that the Shareholders’ Council is 
organized and operates gives rise to members having trust in the Council. 
Thus in the case of the capital restructuring proposal, the Council was able 
to mobilize the membership fairly easily, once it had analyzed the 
proposal and investigated member opinions.  
The redemption risk was an issue considered by the Board when it 
developed its capital restructuring proposal. The members’ rejection of the 
proposal left this issue unresolved. The interviewees in the present 
analysis did not express any major concerns about the equity redemption 
risk.  
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Conclusions 
In 2007, the Board of Directors of the New Zealand dairy 
cooperative Fonterra presented a capital restructuring proposal aimed at 
reducing the cooperative’s equity redemption risk, addressing members’ 
portfolio problem, and acquiring capital for the cooperative’s future 
growth. External owners would be allowed, but members would own most 
of the stock.  
The proposal was rejected by the members. This event attracted 
international attention, because on many other occasions when a 
cooperative board has proposed a similar reform, the members have 
accepted it. Contributing to the attention for Fonterra was the fact that it 
had succeeded in becoming one of world’s largest dairy cooperatives 
without ever having external owners. 
The present analysis suggests that the members’ rejection of the 
capital restructuring plan is related to two specific characteristics of 
Fonterra, namely its Fair Value Share and its Shareholders’ Council. 
These constitutional elements were government requirements for 
permitting the merger that resulted in a market-dominating cooperative in 
the New Zealand dairy industry.  
The Fair Value Share can be criticized because the value 
appreciation is calculated in a complicated administrative way and is not a 
consequence of a market for the shares. The calculation mode is not 
understood by all members. As Fonterra has expanded, the Fair Value 
Share has risen to a level where it is costly for new dairy farmers who 
want to become members. Nevertheless, the Fair Value Share is important 
to the Fonterra shareholders.  
The Fair Value Share system means that the members have so 
much money invested in the cooperative that they are reluctant to embark 
on any new path. The farmers have full ownership of the cooperative 
through their possession of Fair Value Shares. Hence the share is a 
guarantee of full member control. Sharing the ownership of Fonterra with 
external investors could be a step towards demutualization, which would 
be a major threat to the dairy farmers. Only a cooperative could be a 
secure outlet for all the milk that they might produce. The Board’s 
proposal was not a result of any crisis and the members did not consider a 
capital restructuring plan to be necessary. The members had confidence in 
the ownership structure with Fair Value Shares.  
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Another explanation for the members’ rejection of the capital 
restructuring proposal was the parallel governance of Fonterra. The 
cooperative’s Board of Directors has the task of developing the business 
operations. The Shareholders’ Council is the members’ voice in relation to 
the Board and has the task of defending the members’ interests. Hence 
there may be conflicting interests. In connection with the capital 
restructuring proposal, the Council acted to mobilize the membership and 
it succeeded. The members have great trust in the councilors. This is 
especially true for small dairy farmers, whose interests may be more 
threatened by strategies put forward by the Board. Likewise the 
Shareholders’ Council has an important role to play when it comes to 
balancing the influence of groups of shareholders attempting to reap 
benefits for themselves.  
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